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Abstract 
Since 2008, dramatic economic crises have brought falling GDP, rapidly rising unemployment and 
pressure on government to limit public spending to Spain and Italy. These are two countries with 
similar experiences of migration but quite different politics of immigration over the past two decades, 
with public order and security concerns coming to the fore in Italy during the 1990s and 2000s, whilst 
there was a general avoidance of the issue in Spain. Spain and Italy therefore provide a useful 
opportunity to examine the interaction between the economic crisis and political debates on 
immigration. Examining political debates on immigration in the parliaments of both countries from 
2008 to 2011, this paper finds that during the crisis there was not a mainstream negative politicisation 
of immigration in these countries, despite high migration flows, rising high unemployment, aggressive 
austerity from government and uncertainty regarding the economy. This is explained by showing how 
the political debate in each country is mediated by different configurations of public opinion, 
institutions and discursive structures.  
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From 2008, dramatic economic crises brought falling GDP, rapidly rising unemployment and 
government cuts to welfare and public services to Spain and Italy, two countries of high immigration 
in Southern Europe. Where economic issues such as unemployment, welfare spending and the 
affordability of and access to services become highly salient, such as in crisis-stricken countries, 
measures against immigration and immigrants may be presented as potential resolutions by politicians 
aspiring to capitalise on popular angst (Betz 1994; Rydgren 2008; van Dijk 2006). In light of this, it is 
important to ask what impact the recent economic crisis had on the politics of immigration in these 
countries. 
Various studies have acknowledged that the economic crisis has had an impact on 
international migration and the lives of migrants. As noted in the introduction to this special issue, 
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crises are a source of change (Finotelli and Ponzo, in this special issue). Studies have, for example, 
highlighted a slowed rate of increase of global migration flows, a worsening of the employment rate 
and living conditions of immigrants in host societies and a slight increase in those claiming welfare 
support (Koehler et al 2010; Koser 2009; Papademetriou and Terrazas 2009). However, relatively 
little attention has been paid to the representation of immigration in politics during the economic 
crisis. This is despite the fact that political conflicts on immigration have been of interest to much 
previous research (for example, Ford and Goodwin 2014, Rydgren 2008), and that a range of studies 
have highlighted the role that economic conditions can play in influencing the prevalence of anti-
immigrant views in politics (Cea D’Ancona and Valles Martinez 2008, 2011; Dancygier 2010; 
Zamora-Kapoor et al 2013).  
Economic conditions, particularly rising unemployment and cuts to public services, can be 
selectively associated with immigration by political actors for various reasons. They may seek to 
emphasise a sense of competition between host society and migrant groups in order to gain electoral 
support, particularly from the unemployed and those who feel that, in economic terms, they have been 
‘left behind’ (Billiet et al 2014; Ford and Goodwin 2014; Zamora-Kapoor et al 2013). It has also been 
highlighted how the strategic association of immigration with a range of socio-economic problems has 
often benefited radical right-wing and populist political parties, especially during the years of the 
economic crisis (Ellinas 2013). Mayer found, for example, that in France the economic crisis 
amplified the move of the working classes to the far right, which had included anti-immigrant 
sentiment within a broader criticism of globalisation and a rising sense that people no longer felt ‘at 
home’ in the country (2014: 266-7). Kuisma has also argued that economic grievances of voters in 
Finland were associated with immigration by the populist party True Finns in order to justify and de-
radicalise exclusionary policies which may otherwise have been rejected as racist or xenophobic 
(2013).  
These studies offer, however, a limited view. By concentrating on radical right and populist 
parties which have gained support whilst voicing anti-immigrant views, they tell us little about the 
times and places in which such parties do not arise or where an anti-immigrant backlash does not 
become influential in the political mainstream. In contrast, although Spain and Italy were both 
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affected by significant economic crises from 2008, right-wing populist leaders did not significantly 
gain popularity or drive the agenda on the issue in either. The cases of Spain and Italy are therefore 
particularly interesting as examples highlighting how high levels of immigration and economic 
uncertainty do not necessarily result in anti-immigrant views gaining widespread consensus in 
mainstream political debate. The article will also show that although these are two countries with 
similar experiences of migration and economic crisis, the politics of immigration in each has been 
markedly different. Public order and security concerns had come to the fore in Italy during the 1990s 
and 2000s whereas there was a general depoliticisation of the issue in Spain. From 2008, when the 
crisis began, there was little change in political debates on immigration in Spain and the political 
system remained relatively stable, with elites sharing consensual views on the need to minimise any 
potential links with controversial nationalist overtones. In Italy, during the economic crisis the 
governing coalition collapsed and the journeys of migrants in unsafe boats across the Mediterranean 
Sea took a prominent place in media and politics, providing an opportunity for humanitarian 
arguments to come to the fore over the previously-prevalent association of immigration with crime 
and public order.  
The paper is structured as follows over the next four sections. Firstly, it describes the way that 
political debates are mediated and shaped by social and political contexts. It then describes the 
contexts of immigration and economic crisis in Spain and Italy, highlighting in particular the 
institutional and discursive configuration in each before presenting the ways that immigration has 
been framed in the respective parliaments. The final section concludes. 
 
Shaping political debate 
 
Previous research on political debates on immigration has aspired to unveil xenophobic, racist and 
prejudiced ways of talking and thinking in politics and society (e.g. Edelman 1964, van Dijk 2006). 
They have a broadly shared focus on the symbolic dimension of political competition and in particular 
on the ability of political leaders to construct and manipulate the public’s interpretation of issues and 
social groups (Edelman 1964). Political leaders have been seen to have considerable freedom to 
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determine how issues are presented in political debate because they see audiences as largely incapable 
of accessing and understanding sufficient information to develop accurate opinions (Ibid.: 27-8). 
However, in practice the ways that political elites publicly discuss issues are constrained and 
mediated by social and political contexts. On one hand, politicians often need to present their 
arguments in ways that respond to and intersect with the public’s opinions and concerns. Political 
leaders are elected to stand for their constituents (Pitkin 1967), taking their claims and ideas into the 
political arena (Urbinati 2000: 767). Audiences can actively interpret and contest their comments and 
if politicians wish to achieve particular responses, such as increased support from constituents or 
peers, then their arguments and the issues or events that they refer to must be understandable, relevant 
and recognisable (Manin 1997: 218-230). As a result, arguments often take symbolic cues from and 
look to align with existent discourses and dominant cleavages that are already accepted by the public 
as relatively coherent and legitimate (Tarrow 1998: 110; Snow et al 1986). By shaping and situating 
arguments in this way, political actors can seek to facilitate the comprehension and acceptance of their 
own view. These legitimate and accepted existent discourses have been defined in the literature as 
discursive or cultural opportunity structures (Cinalli and Giugni 2011; Magnani 2012).  On the other 
hand, the content of political debate is also shaped by the contextual opportunities that political actors 
have to present their views. In order to have their view heard and influence others, political actors 
require opportunities to access the political system and build alliances with potential supporters (Diani 
1996, Tarrow 1998). Where the political system restricts access and where alliances among dominant 
actors are strong, such as in popular catch-all political parties, then it will be difficult for new voices 
to gain a presence and influence the terms of the debate. These opportunities to access political debate 
and the stability of alliances among elites can be summarised as institutional opportunity structures.  
There is a long-standing debate around the relative importance of two perspectives in the 
framing of immigration and similar contentious issues (e.g. Statham 2003; Statham and Gray 2005). 
While some have argued that public perceptions of difference inform political discourse (Thranhardt 
1995), others have stated that political dynamics among elites have greater influence (Freeman 1995). 
This article finds, in line with the former, that in both Spain and Italy political debate on immigration 
during the economic crisis followed the general contours of public opinion. However, what is of 
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particular interest is also how and why this took place, which requires that the relationship between 
public opinion and political debate are examined in the light of the contextual dynamics of each time 
and place as the content of political debate is mediated by contingent configurations of public opinion, 
institutions and discursive structures (Scholten 2011, Wimmer 2012). 
The analysis will examine the way that immigration is presented in the politics of both 
countries through a frame analysis of parliamentary debates over the period from May 2008 to April 
2011. As will be shown in the next section, from May 2008 GDP fell and unemployment rose in both 
countries. By 2011, GDP had risen but was falling again (a so-called ‘double-dip’ recession) and 
unemployment had continued to rise. The severity of the crisis, in terms of falling wealth and 
extended hardship, could therefore be increasingly felt. At the same time, the size of the immigrant 
population in both countries continued to rise. As a result, these years provide an opportunity to 
examine the evolution of political debate in a context of rising immigration but declining GDP, 
increasing unemployment and economic uncertainty. The article also situates the parliamentary 
debates in their social and political context. ‘Context’ is characterised here with three dimensions; 
firstly, events beyond the control of politicians may push immigration onto the agenda, such as the 
widely reported arrival of large numbers of forced migrants fleeing popular unrest and violence in 
their countries of origin. Secondly, concerns of the public, expressed in public opinion surveys, may 
influence the issues that politicians seeking to represent the concerns of their constituents choose to 
address. Finally, institutional and discursive opportunity structures can have an impact on whose 
voice can be heard and which arguments are likely to get consensus and support.  
Recently, analysis of political debate and issue frames in particular has enjoyed something of 
a renaissance in migration studies (e.g. Allen and Blinder 2013, Benson 2013, Bleich et al 2015, 
Lawlor 2015, Vicol and Allen 2014). Studies have uncovered a myriad of issue frames, such as on 
economic change and the threat of violence from immigration (Lawlor 2015: 3) as well as victim 
frames, a beneficial frame, and problem frames (Bleich et al 2015: 7). Benson also identified ten 
immigration frames, grouping them as victim frames (a global economy frame, a humanitarian frame 
and a racism/xenophobia frame), hero frames (a cultural diversity frame, an integration frame and a 
good worker frame), and finally threat frames (a jobs frame, a public order frame, a fiscal frame and a 
7 
 
national cohesion frame) (2013). The frames signalled in this previous literature provided a coding 
guide for the examination of Spanish and Italian parliamentary debates (the full list of frames found in 
the material is shown below, in Table 1).  
Contributions to debates were gathered from searching online databases hosted by each 
country’s parliament. An actor’s whole intervention was taken as possible venue for one frame, 
meaning that multiple frames could not be coded from single interventions. In this article, citations are 
included where possible that are representative of the whole frame for that particular intervention. 
Each frame was composed of (a) a problem definition, (b) an assertion of the cause of that problem, 
(c) an assignment of the moral implications of the problem and (d) a proposed response to the 
problem (Entman 1993). A typical competition frame could state the problem to be that (a) there are 
scarce jobs and funds for native citizens, as a result of (b) competition from immigrants, which (c) 
increases poverty, unemployment and insecurity of native citizens and (d) should be addressed by 
restricting migration. A humanitarian frame, in contrast, may focus on the problem of (a) the suffering 
of migrants in boats crossing the Mediterranean Sea, caused by (b) their disadvantaged situation in 
countries of departure which is (c) the responsibility of international leaders to address by (d) 
increasing search and rescue or stopping boats from departing at all. One group of frames that did not 
fit into the extant categories was the ‘unity’ frame, which was particularly present in Spain and 
emphasised the need to depoliticise immigration to maintain unity among the political class and in 
society, as will be described later. 
The subsequent section will summarise the dynamics of immigration and economic crisis in 
Spain and Italy, before examining the different contexts and framing patterns in each country. 
 
 
[Table 1 near here] 
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Immigration and crisis in Spain and Italy 
 
Spain and Italy represent two contexts of high immigration that were hit particularly hard by the 
economic crisis from 2008. It has often been suggested that these countries are broadly comparable in 
their experiences of immigration, in line with a ‘Southern European’ model of immigration 
characterised by rapidly growing migration flows, little legislation for integration and high levels of 
undocumented residence (see Finotelli and Ponzo, introduction to this special issue). Indeed, in both 
countries there had been a rapid increase in the immigrant population during the decade leading to the 
crisis: between 1998 and 2008 the population of registered immigrants in Italy rose from 991,678 to 
3,432,651 (according to data from the Institute for Statistics, ISTAT) and in Spain from 719,647 to 
4,473,499 (according to data from the National Statistics Institute, INE). This growth continued from 
2008 until 2011, despite the arrival of the economic crisis in these countries (see Figure 1). After 2011 
immigration stopped rising in both.  
 
 
[Figure  1 near here] 
 
 
 
Italy and Spain also saw significant economic crises from 2008. In Italy, annual GDP growth 
fell from 1.7% in 2007 to -1.2% in 2008 and -5.5% in 2009 (see Figure 2). Unemployment rose from 
6.1% in 2007 to 8.4% in 2010 and again to 10.7% in 2012 (see Figure 3). Spain was also gripped by a 
financial and then economic crisis resulting in growth in GDP per year falling from 4.1% in 2006 to 
0.9% in 2008 and -3.8% in 2009 (Figure 2), followed by a dramatic increase in the level of 
unemployment from 8.5% in 2006 to 20.1% in 2011 and 24.8% in 2012 (Figure 3). In both countries, 
GDP rates seemed to rise in 2010 but would fall again in 2011, signalling a return to recession. The 
employment situation hit young people, those on lower incomes and the unqualified particularly hard 
in both countries (Gutierrez 2014: 379). The crisis also put severe pressure on social expenditure as 
9 
 
the need for support to those at risk from poverty increased, whilst austerity budgets were proposed by 
various European Union partners to make savings (Gutierrez 2014). This, together with rising 
unemployment, meant a reduction in the capacity of the Spanish and Italian governments to reduce 
income inequality and protect against poverty. 
The following sections will look at how debates on immigration developed against the 
backdrop of this context of crisis. 
 
[Figure  2 near here] 
 
[Figure  3 near here] 
 
A call for unity: the politics of immigration and crisis in Spain’s Congreso de los Diputados 
 
Context 
 
The Spanish politics of immigration have been generally characterised by stability following the 
consolidation of democracy after the end of the authoritarian regime of General Franco (Gunther and 
Montero 2009; Torcal and Chhibber 1995). Cross-party consensus during this time emphasised the 
importance of democracy and equal rights and an avoidance of the ideology, symbols and memories 
of Francoist nationalism (Núñez Seixas 2005: 122). This civic consensus was subsequently 
maintained between Spain’s large, stable catch-all parties, the Partido Socialista Obrero Español 
(PSOE) on the left and the Partido Popular (PP) on the right, which consistently held 80% of the 
available seats between them in general elections for three decades following the transition to 
democracy (Gunther and Montero 2009: 99).
1
  
                                                          
1
 It is worth noting here that the Spanish general election of 2015 provided the first change in this pattern of stable 
alternation between the two dominant parties. Not only did neither of these parties gain sufficient support to form a 
government, but also new political actors on the left (Podemos) and the right (Ciudadanos) each made significant gains, 
receiving 21% and 14% of the vote, respectively. 
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Controversial debates on immigration have during this time been largely avoided due to their 
potentially divisive nature when tied to questions of nationhood and identity (Arango 2013; Morales 
et al 2015). Over most of the 1990s and the 2000s immigration was treated mostly as a technical 
political issue to be kept off the mainstream agenda (Zapata-Barrero 2003) and the main parties 
tended to refer to ‘immigrants’ as a general category, distinguishing only between legal and illegal 
migration rather than speaking of specific nationalities or ethnic groups (Morales et al 2015). This is 
despite claims that immigration was ‘discovered’ as a contentious issue in the early 2000s in response 
to anti-immigrant riots in the southern market town of El Ejido (Zapata-Barrero 2003). Public opinion 
also showed great concern about immigration during 2005 and 2006 (see Figure 4), as significant 
increases in irregular migration flows from West Africa to the Canary Islands put images of migrants 
heading across the sea in rickety fishing boats at the top of the news agenda. And yet, in politics the 
consensus between the principal parties had returned by 2008, as reflected in political manifestos for 
that year’s election: in the PP’s manifesto, the chapter on immigration emphasised the preference of 
legal over illegal immigration and pledged to establish ‘an integration model’ based on ‘our principles 
and constitutional values’ (PP 2008: 20); the PSOE manifesto of the same year stated almost the 
same, taking a stance against illegal immigration and calling for greater integration ‘starting from the 
recognition of our constitutional values and our rights and obligations’ (PSOE 2008: 13-4). 
Over the period that is the focus of this study, from 2008, immigration declined in salience in 
public opinion (see Figure 4). Indeed, in Eurobarometer surveys in the first half of the 2000s 
immigration had been consistently ranked among the three greatest concerns for the Spanish 
population, but during the years of the economic crisis it became consistently less salient. Arrivals of 
migrants to the Canary Islands slowed and immigration occupied less of the headlines. Meanwhile, in 
politics the stable alternation of power between the PSOE and the PP continued: the governing 
Socialists gave way to the PP in the general election of 2011. However, this was a snap election called 
in order to give way to a new government able, in the words of the outgoing President Zapatero, to 
‘address the economy’s uncertainties’ (El Pais, 29th July 2011). The government had already been 
pushed to pass deep cuts to public budgets in May 2010 and Zapatero’s popularity had sunk (Barreiro 
and Cuenca 2012). A year later, in May 2011, a series of mass protests by the Movimiento 15-M 
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struck Spain’s cities as thousands of protesters known as the indignados took to the streets, but no 
major new parties had made an impact on the political system by 2011, when voters punished the 
incumbent PSOE in local elections across the country by casting blank votes or supporting the PP.  
By the 2011 elections by far and away the most concerning issues to the Spanish public were 
unemployment and the economic situation. On this count, the indignados and similar movements such 
as the Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (Platform for those Affected by Mortgages) played an 
important part in increasing the saliency of economic concerns as part of a broad critique of the 
country’s political institutions and economic model, demanding ‘real democracy’ rather than the 
existent party system dominated by socialists and conservatives (Barreiro and Cuenca 2012; 
Fominaya 2015). In this way, they could be seen as pushing for a ‘second democratic transition’, 
renewing the aspiration for a more democratic Spain from three decades earlier (Fominaya 2015: 
467). Their impact has however been described as ‘more substantial on the public agenda than on the 
electoral results’ (Barreiro and Cuenca 2012: 289). 
Thus, in summary, the crisis had a significant impact on public opinion over the period from 
2008 to 2011, but immigration did not. The institutional and discursive context was characterised by 
stability of the two principal political parties, although expressions of popular unrest were directed at 
the country’s political and economic elites. Demands for change concentrated on institutional renewal 
and greater democratic participation for all.  
 
[Figure  4 near here 
 
Framing immigration during the crisis 
 
In the Spanish parliament over the period from May 2008 to April 2011 a total of 72 speeches were 
made on immigration in which complete frames were constructed. Reflecting the dominance of the 
two main parties in the Spanish Congress, the greatest number of speeches was made by the PSOE 
(29 in total), in large part due to them being in the government and having to respond to 
interrogations, and the PP, which also made 21 speeches. The smaller parties made between only 5 
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and 7 each. A range of ways of presenting immigration were presented, with the most common being 
unity frames (32%) and control frames (31%). Humanitarian frames were also common (22%), but 
competition did not arise to any significant degree (7% of speeches) (see Figure 5). 
 
[Figure  5 near here] 
 
 The economic crisis had a significant presence in parliamentary debates on immigration over 
the period studied. This took two principal forms; one was as a way for the PP to criticise the 
incumbent PSOE government and the other as a call for unity from other parties to prevent such a 
contentious topic damaging Spain’s political balance.  
Criticism of the government which explicitly linked immigration and the crisis was rare, but 
when it did arise it came in the form of competition and control frames voiced by the PP. The 
competition frame argued that persistently high levels of immigration combined with the effects of the 
economic crisis would create social tensions, marginalisation and crime: 
 
“the situation of unemployment that we are passing through … now affects thousands and 
thousands of families everyday who find no joy in the policies of the government and this 
only takes them closer to desperation and unemployment. Immigration is a positive 
phenomenon for a country with growth and opportunities for all, but can change to a serious 
problem when things are done badly … and the economic crisis that the government created 
is now making things worse” 
(Rafael Antonio Hernando Fraile, PP, 21/05/2008) 
 
As seen in the quote, the PP clearly blamed the PSOE for the economic crisis whilst stating that 
immigration could make the situation even worse. At the same time, the PP also criticised the 
economic situation within a broader and much more common criticism of the PSOE as out of control 
and therefore unable to effectively govern the country. The use of these control frames saw the party 
13 
 
argue that under the PSOE migration rates were too high, that there was too much illegal immigration, 
too many mass regularisations and that deportations were ineffective: 
 
“[the Interior Minister] has converted his ministry into the Ministry of Propaganda and 
Secrets and when you don’t like something you cover or hide it, whether deaths in pateras, 
foreigners who are not deported, the SIVE (radar system at sea) that does not work, illegal 
immigrants or the number of crimes committed in Spain”  
(Rafael Antonio Hernando Fraile, PP, 11/03/2009) 
 
“The situation of immigrants in our country is, unfortunately, much worse now than it was a 
few years ago … the government has been incapable of developing policies because even 
[they] do not believe in the reform that [they] have done; failure to link immigration to 
employment … failure to integrate, because integration policies cannot be based only on 
giving grants; failure to coordinate regional and local governments, which are loaded with 
tasks and obligations which they have no budget to carry out; and failure in combatting illegal 
immigration, shown by the falling number of deportations and returns and rising number of 
illegal immigrants in our country” 
(Rafael Antonio Hernando Fraile, PP, 23/03/2011) 
 
The control frame thus served as a way of undermining the current government and criticising the 
level of immigration, but it only referred to immigration as a general process and never to specific 
groups of migrants. The cause was claimed to be the government’s inadequacy and the solution 
proposed was a change of government. 
The response from the government and other left wing parties was to refer to the crisis 
through a ‘unity’ frame. This was the most frequently used frame and was voiced by a range of 
different parties, predominantly from the left including the small network Izquierda Unida (IU) and 
the regional Basque Nationalists in the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), as well as the PSOE. The 
PP did not use the unity frame. When using the unity frame, the speaker could admit that there were 
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challenges related to immigration and a need for policy reform, but that this should not result in the 
issue becoming politicised or polemical. The unity frame instead claimed that immigration debates 
were often inflammatory and discriminatory and so had the potential to turn political parties, 
government ministries and social groups against each other. Reflecting the concerns of public opinion, 
the economic crisis was frequently mentioned, although it was so in hypothetical dystopian images of 
a divided, conflict-ridden Spain if consensus, unity and measures to protect immigrants were not 
found. The resolution was to establish and always maintain consensus in order to even discuss 
immigration in public: 
 
“on this type of issue, consensus is a paradigm. I cannot conceive an initiative that refers to 
the problems of immigration – multidisciplinary and complex – and that is not founded on 
wide consensus, on a definitive State-wide pact” 
(Emilio Olabarría Muñoz, Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), 09/12/2008) 
 
“it is the will of the government, and in a concrete manner of this ministry and minister, to 
work with the greatest possible consensus with all political actors to arrive at an agreement 
about immigration issues” 
(Celestino Corbacho Chaves, PSOE, 11/06/2008) 
 
“keep in mind that, despite the crisis, the amount of net migration to Spain continues to be 
positive, because there are immigrants who leave and others who arrive … we are not only 
talking, particularly in a context of economic crisis, about the importance of first reception 
policies but also about the integration policies for the second generation … [and] as there is 
less money, let’s be more efficient and more collaborative through our institutions” 
(Joan Tardà i Coma, Izquierda Unida (IU), 20/04/2010) 
 
The prevalence of the unity frame reflects the long-lasting consensus in Spain on the importance of 
maintaining unity in the state and in society by not politicising divisive issues. It also confirmed the 
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efforts of Spain’s politicians on the left to emphasise principles of democracy and tolerance in a 
potentially conflictive public debate. This could also be seen as a tactic to delay any action on 
reforming immigration policies, as there was little demand from social movements and public opinion 
to concentrate on the issue (and little money in public purses to do so). 
Finally, humanitarian frames were also common in Spanish debates, employed above all in 
reference to the situation of migrants who had gone to Spain by boat, arriving at the Canary Islands 
from the coasts of West Africa, particularly during 2008. In these references, the humanitarian frame 
was employed to signal that children were suffering as a result of international inequality and 
ineffective Spanish policies that were not protecting sufficiently at sea or on arrival: 
 
“care for unaccompanied migrant children who arrive on the Canary Islands is a serious 
problem … in 15 days we will sign an agreement so that this very serious problem has a 
social and humanitarian response that is deserving of a country like Spain” 
(Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, PSOE, 19/11/2008) 
 
The humanitarian frame here was employed as a way of calling for action in order to save people who 
are suffering. In Spanish debate, the action required was claimed to be greater involvement of the EU 
in relocating people and preventing migration on dangerous routes. 
In summary, the political debate on immigration in Spain during the economic crisis years of 
2008 to 2011 was dominated principally by the division between the PSOE and the PP, reflecting their 
continued stability as the two key political parties at this time. The PP employed control and 
competition frames to criticise the incumbent PSOE government, but their response was to emphasise 
a need for unity. The unity frame was a consensual view held by all parties except for the PP, 
emphasising the need for a stable, inclusive society and avoiding nationalism, in alignment with the 
post-transition democratic consensus. This, in addition to the fact that the salience of immigration in 
public opinion surveys was low throughout the period studied, ensured that it was unlikely to be a 
fruitful topic to build political capital for the PP in opposition to the PSOE.  
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A humanitarian lens: the politics of immigration in Italy’s Camera dei Deputati 
 
Context 
 
The early politics of immigration in Italy developed during a time of political and social upheaval that 
would set the tone for the years to follow. During the 1980s and 1990s, social change and political 
corruption scandals heralded a shift in the balance of party competition, as traditional political 
formations of Christian Democrats and Communists crumbled (Diani 1996, Zincone 1998). Instability 
became the mainstay of Italian politics: between 1994 and 2011 there would be eleven different 
governments, nearly all of which collapsed due to intra-coalition and intra-partisan conflicts 
(Pasquino and Valbruzzi 2012: 1470). New political formations such as the populist Lega Nord (LN) 
and Forza Italia! (FI) came into power, vocally criticising immigrants and shifting the political 
response to immigration from under-evaluation to over-evaluation of its relevance (Zincone 1998: 
44). On the right, coalitions led by Silvio Berlusoni and uniting LN, FI and the ex-fascist Alleanza 
Nazionale (AN) governed in 1994, from 2001 to 2006, and again from 2008 to 2011. On the left the 
main party, which went through various iterations, name changes and internal struggles before settling 
as the Partito Democratico (PD) in 2007, governed in coalitions from 1996 to 2001 and 2006 to 2008. 
Over this time only one government completed the full term of its mandate.  
Political debates on immigration often emphasised a threat of insecurity and declining public 
order. These views acted as a glue among coalition partners on the right who held divergent views on 
other issues, with LN being an especially vocal critic of immigration as an invasion posing a threat to 
the economic, cultural and political unity of the North of Italy (Geddes 2008: 354). A generalised 
perception of extracomunitari, immigrants from beyond the European Community, was also 
associated with acts of criminality and threats to public order in the press (Sciortino and Colombo 
2004). In 2007 concerns regarding Romanians and the Roma in particular reached feverish levels as 
two highly publicised murders by immigrants were followed by Italian gangs attacking informal 
‘nomad camps’ on the outskirts of large cities (McMahon 2015). The concern about crime was clearly 
reflected in public opinion as it became the most salient issue recorded in Eurobarometer surveys at 
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the end of 2007 (see Figure 6). At the same time, factions on the left were divided, failing to form 
strong governments when in power and struggling to build a shared post-socialist platform in 
opposition (Picker 2011). The consequence was a lack of consensus on the left on how to address 
immigration and minority-related issues.  
However, during the period examined here, three important changes took place which altered 
the context in which political debates on immigration were situated. First, as the economic crisis 
developed the parties on the right entered their own political crisis. Over the period studied, the 
governing coalition of the Popolo della Libertá (PdL, a conglomeration of FI and AN) and LN 
increasingly faced a decline in public support, fuelled in part by the economic difficulties and widely 
publicised scandals involving its leader Silvio Berlusconi. A general decline came in the LN vote 
share in national elections, from 8% in elections in 2008 to 4% in 2013. A further sign of decline was 
the disintegration of the right-wing coalition: in 2010 Gianfranco Fini, previously the leader of AN, 
coalition partner of Berlusconi and Speaker of the House of Deputies, left to form his own group, 
Futuro e Libertá (FLI). By May 2011, the centre-right had lost much of its support in local elections 
and its decline came to a head in November when the government lost a confidence vote and was 
replaced by a cabinet of technocrats, led by ex-EU Commissioner and academic Mario Monti. Finally, 
whereas the PdL agreed to support the technocrat government, LN did not, causing the coalition 
between these parties to split for the first time since the turn of the century. The period from 2008 to 
2011 thus saw the collapse of the coalition of parties which had so effectively dominated the 
immigration debate since the 1990s. 
Second, during this period immigration was not particularly high on the list of issues 
concerning Italian public opinion. From 2008 to 2011 the economic crisis had far greater salience, 
with the issues of greatest concern in Eurobarometer surveys recorded as inflation and, above all, the 
economic situation and unemployment (see Figure 6). Crime, which had previously been associated 
with immigration, also dropped in significance. Subsequent survey data prior to the 2013 elections 
found that only 0.1% of respondents considered immigration to be an important issue (Biorcio 2013: 
40-1). It seemed that the previously fruitful association of immigration with crime would not give a 
great deal of political capital. 
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Third, during the period from 2008 to 2011 there was a significant increase in the arrival (and 
visibility in the media) of boats of migrants fleeing from North Africa to Italy, and in particular the 
small Italian island of Lampedusa. By 2006 nearly all of the arrivals to Italy’s coastline were to Sicily 
and Lampedusa, but in 2010 the sea route was blocked by increased cooperation with North African 
governments, in particular that of Libya (Paoletti 2011). In 2008, the Italian government had signed a 
controversial Partnership Treaty which included shared border patrols and a readmission agreement in 
a five-billion-euro settlement of colonial memory to Libya. With the social and political unrest that 
came to North Africa during the Arab Spring, followed by violent conflict, these controls broke down 
(McMahon 2012). Between January and April 2011 there were 390 crossings bringing 25,867 
migrants to Italy (Ministero dell’Interno 29th March 2011). These events were reflected in an increase 
in the public’s concerns about immigration in 2011 (see Figure 6). And yet, as will be shown in the 
following section, a combination of decreasing influence of the parties on the right and increasing 
visibility of suffering in North Africa and the Mediterranean Sea meant that this immigration would 
be associated primarily with humanitarian concerns. 
 
[Figure  6 near here] 
 
Framing immigration 
 
In the Italian parliament over the period from May 2008 to April 2011 a total of 96 speeches 
were made on immigration in which complete frames were constructed. Reflecting the 
collapse of the right wing parties outline above, the single party with most speeches was the 
PD, followed by the centrist Unione Democratico del Centro (UCD) and then the right wing 
PDL (in government at the time). The LN, which had dominated the tone of the immigration 
debate during the previous decade made only 7 speeches. In contrast to preceding years, over 
the period of the crisis the most common way of debating immigration was through a 
humanitarian frame (68% of speeches). The competition frame, in contrast, shaped only 8% 
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of the speeches and other frames viewing immigration as a threat (Burden and Control 
frames) were even less frequent (see Figure 7).  
 
[Figure  7 near here] 
 
In Italy the economic crisis was not explicitly mentioned in reference to immigration 
during the period studied, although a few cases of the competition frame arose in disparate 
speeches on employment and education. These claimed that in specific cases the treatment of 
immigrants was unequal to that of Italians, favouring the immigrants: 
 
“the large presence of foreign students in classes in compulsory schooling brings 
about objective difficulties in terms of teaching and students’ learning … [but] the 
presence of foreign children as well as nomads and children of parents with refugee 
status implies additional economic and teaching resources” 
(Roberto Cota, LN, 16/09/2008) 
 
The cases of the competition frame predominantly reflected on single, particular cases in 
local contexts rather than making a broader case linking immigration and the economic crisis 
across the country. As a result, they were not repeated nor shared across party lines.  
In contrast, the most prominent issue in the debates was that of migration to Italy 
across the Mediterranean. In the parliament the burden placed on the island of Lampedusa 
and the presence of illegal trafficking were mentioned, but above all the emphasis lay on the 
plight of the migrants themselves and the harm caused by joint maritime patrols by Italian 
and Libyan forces. A humanitarian frame was employed by representatives from across the 
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party spectrum. For example, in 2009 a series of speeches concentrated on ‘pushbacks’ of 
migrant boats at sea, which contravened international law and the Italian constitution: 
 
 “on 1st July 2009, 82 refugees and migrants, mostly of Eritrean nationality, have 
been consigned from the Italian military ship ‘Orione’ to Libyan military ships in high 
seas … according to the claims from these people, at least 8 suffered physical 
violence by the Italian military … [the government should think again about] the 
policy of pushbacks that has principally hit those in need of international protection” 
(Savino Pezzotta, UDC, 21/07/2009) 
 
“in all cases of pushbacks that have taken place since May 2009 to today, there has 
been no process of identification of the migrants nor a review of their health nor 
verification of the requirements for being granted international protection … every 
person under the control of the Italian authorities, including those intercepted in sea, 
should have guaranteed equal and complete asylum procedures” 
(Antonello Soro, PD, 27/10/2009) 
 
Later, in 2010 and 2011, concern was also shown for the impact of the unrest in North Africa: 
 
“faced with a humanitarian tragedy of dimensions which have been called ‘Biblical’, 
many European partners, above all in the north of Europe, are holding back the 
opportunity to adopt united, strong and immediate European initiatives … the 
establishment of burden sharing among Member States in reference to both refugees 
and irregular migrants seems indispensable” 
(Marco Giovanni Reguzzoni, LN, 07/03/2011) 
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In this last quote, although the term ‘burden’ is mentioned the problem raised is the 
humanitarian tragedy facing migrants at sea. Burden-sharing is proposed as a solution to 
prevent that human suffering. The responsibility for the tragedy happening is placed firmly 
with Europe in general for lacking a strong migration policy at sea. The proposed response is 
a concerted effort to prevent migration, showing how a humanitarian need can be presented 
to justify restrictive and security-based measures. This mirrors Fassin’s observation that the 
deployment of humanitarian language in public debates on migration has become the most 
likely to generate support among public audiences to justify practices aimed at the 
government of human beings (2012: 2-3). The quotes from representatives of parties on the 
right (Lega Nord), left (Partito Democratico) and centre (Unione Democratico di Centro) of 
Italy’s political spectrum illustrate the prominence of this humanitarian reason across party 
lines, despite its association with varying political responses to migrant suffering.
2
 Inter-party 
contention focused on the specifics of responses to the situation, but was broadly consensual 
on the frame employed. Consequently, although public salience of immigration did increase 
in response to the boat arrivals of 2011, the way that the topic was framed in politics was 
through this consensual humanitarian lens. 
 Similarly, the plight of unaccompanied and undocumented children migrating to Italy 
found consensus across the parties through a humanitarian frame. Concern was shown for 
children disappearing from care homes, due in particular to the dangers posed by organised 
criminals; 
 
“the Interior Ministry has recently affirmed that there are many concrete cases 
showing a close link between the disappearance of immigrant children from reception 
                                                          
2
 The comments from the LN representative are particularly surprising; in 2009 the party had put a simple videogame on its 
Facebook page which asked players to shoot immigrant boats out of the water (La Repubblica 21
st
 August 2009). 
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centres and organ trafficking … [this is] one of the most inhumane and most 
unworthy forms of exploitation in Italian culture and tradition” 
(Paola Binetti, PD, 04/02/2009) 
 
“a large part of the children left in reception centres face an uncertain future, in many 
cases moving away without trace and exposing themselves to the dangers of 
exploitation by organised crime and/or of serious risks for their safety … the 
government should take control to ensure that right to asylum of unaccompanied 
foreign children is effective” 
(Alessandra Mussolini, PDL, 06/05/2009) 
 
Again, these references highlight how the humanitarian frame was employed in speeches 
from left and right wing parties (the PD and PDL, respectively), with the result of calling for 
greater support for migrant children who had rights to protection and needed care due to their 
vulnerability. Reflecting the low level of salience of the topic at the time, immigration was 
not employed as a dividing issue across party lines. 
 So in summary, the Italian parliamentary debate on immigration from 2008 to 2011 
had little to do with the economic crisis. Migration and crime, which had previously been 
associated with each other in political debate, had low salience in public opinion as dramatic 
events in the Mediterranean, specifically the death and hardship of people at sea, came to 
dominate the agenda. Meanwhile, there was a shifting balance of political power with the PD 
becoming the most vocal on immigration and the coalition that governed up to 2011 having a 
declining presence. In particular, LN contributed very little in the parliament, although the 
analysis above suggests that they adopted more of a focus on local issues and controversial 
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online communication. Consequently, there was a considerable focus on humanitarian 
language to refer to migration flows across the Mediterranean by all political parties.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has explored the impact of the economic crisis on the politics of immigration in 
Italy and Spain. These are two countries with similar experiences of migration but quite 
different politics of immigration over the past two decades, with public order and security 
concerns coming to the fore in Italy during the 1990s and 2000s and considerably less interest 
in the issue in Spain. Moreover, from 2008 onwards both of these countries have faced 
economic crises with negative effects on the growth of the economy, unemployment and 
pressure on government to limit public spending. They have therefore provided a useful 
opportunity to examine the interaction between the economic crisis and political debates on 
immigration. 
The analysis has shown how there was not a predominance of anti-immigrant views in 
political debate in either country over the period studied. Whereas in Spain this represented a 
continuation of previous trends, in Italy it constituted quite a change. These findings should 
be viewed against the backdrop of broader dynamics. In Spain there was little change in the 
politics of immigration because the crisis took place in a context of low salience in public 
opinion and a relatively stable political system where elites shared enduring consensual views 
on immigration and its potentially negative connotations with controversial nationalist 
overtones. The stability of the main two parties also left little opportunity for new political 
actors to present alternative frames. Indeed, in the parliament efforts were made to maintain a 
consensual and unified approach to immigration. Outside of the parliament, popular 
frustration regarding the crisis and increasing protests about unemployment and the economy 
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were directed at the country’s political institutions rather than at immigrants. In Italy, there 
was also a low level of salience of immigration in public opinion but at the same time there 
was a collapse of right wing political parties amidst scandals and increasing distrust from the 
public. This context heralded a significant change in the debate on immigration, from a 
predominant public order and security lens maintained by consensus by right-wing coalitions 
during the previous two decades, to a humanitarian focus. This mirrored, in particular, the 
prevalence of images of protest and then violence in North Africa as well as hardship on the 
journey across the Mediterranean in news stories and parliamentary debates. There was no 
mention of an economic crisis at all and even when the competition frame was employed it 
was unable to provide the basis for consensus with their previous coalition partners. 
The findings suggest that even at a time of economic crisis, low public salience of 
migration may mean that there is little political capital to be gained from mobilising around 
anti-immigrant positions. However, this only tells part of the story; to see how and why 
certain arguments arise it is not only necessary to highlight whether either public opinion or 
political dynamics influence how immigration is represented, but also how the interaction 
between them is mediated and shaped by context. Whereas the stability of the closed 
institutional and discursive context in Spain maintained a strong, consensual counter-
narrative to controversial debates on migration, in Italy it was political instability and the 
decline of the actors who had previously maintained a negative anti-immigrant discourse 
which enabled a new consensus around humanitarian concerns to come to the fore. Thus, in 
order for an economic crisis to influence the politics of immigration it would also need to 
have an impact on the strength and stability of existing political systems. 
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Frame title Description 
Humanitarian Immigrants are in disadvantaged situations, not caused by their own 
actions, and need help to improve their welfare and have their rights 
guaranteed 
Integration Immigration poses challenges but there should be changes in the host 
country to ensure immigrants can integrate 
Competition Immigrants compete for already scarce jobs and funds, increasing poverty, 
unemployment and insecurity 
Public order Immigrants have dangerous, violent cultures and pose a threat to public 
order and safety 
Burden Immigrants absorb public funds because they need support but this is a 
burden for states and local authorities so cannot go on indefinitely  
Control Immigration is out of control and policies are ineffective, requiring 
stronger borders and reduced migratory flows 
Unity  Immigration is a positive phenomenon but also complex, contentious and 
potentially divisive, so should not be politicised but addressed with 
maximum consensus and unity from the political class 
Table 1. Frames found in parliamentary debates in Italy and Spain, 2008-2011 
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 Figure 1. Size of immigration population in Spain and Italy, 2003-2012 (data from Italy’s Institute for 
Statistics ISTAT and Spain’s National Statistics Institute, INE) 
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Figure 2. GDP in Spain and Italy 2003-2012 (data from ISTAT and INE) 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Unemployment in Spain and Italy 2007-2012 (data from ISTAT and INE) 
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Figure 5. Immigration frames in Spanish parliamentary debate, 2008-2011 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Immigration frames in Italian parliament debates, 2008-2011 
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